In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states. The game is played for infinitely many rounds and thus the players construct an infinite path in the graph. We consider reachability objectives where the first player tries to ensure a target state to be visited almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1) or positively (i.e., with positive probability), no matter the strategy of the second player.
INTRODUCTION
Games on Graphs. Two-player games on graphs play a central role in several important problems in computer science, such as controller synthesis [Pnueli and Rosner 1989; Ramadge and Wonham 1987] , verification of open systems [Alur et al. 2002] , realizability and compatibility checking [Abadi et al. 1989; Dill 1989; de Alfaro and Henzinger 2001] , and many others. Most results about two-player games on graphs make the hypothesis of perfect observation (i.e., both players have perfect or complete observation about the state of the game). This assumption is often not realistic in practice. For example in the context of hybrid systems, the controller acquires information about the state of a plant using digital sensors with finite precision, which gives imperfect information about the state of the plant [De Wulf et al. 2006; Henzinger and Kopke 1999] . Similarly, in a concurrent system where the players represent individual processes, each process has only access to the public variables of the other processes, not to their private variables [Reif 1984; Alur et al. 2002] . Such problems are better modeled in the more general framework of partial-observation games [Reif 1979 [Reif , 1984 Reif and Peterson 1980; Chatterjee et al. 2007; ] and have been studied in the context of verification and synthesis [Kupferman and Vardi 2000; Dimitrova and Finkbeiner 2008] .
Partial-Observation Stochastic Games and Subclasses.
In two-player partialobservation stochastic games on graphs with a finite state space, in every round, both players independently and simultaneously choose actions which along with the current state give a probability distribution over the successor states in the game. In a general setting, the players may not be able to distinguish certain states that are observationally equivalent for them (e.g., if they differ only by the value of private variables). The state space is partitioned into observations defined as equivalence classes and the players do not see the actual state of the game, but only an observation (which is typically different for the two players). The model of partial-observation games we consider is the same as the model of stochastic games with signals ] and is a standard model in game theory [Rosenberg et al. 2003; Sorin 2002] . It subsumes other classical game models such as concurrent games [Shapley 1953; de Alfaro et al. 2007 ], probabilistic automata [Rabin 1963; Bukharaev 1980; Paz 1971] , and partial-observation Markov decision processes (POMDPs) [Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis 1987] (see also the recent decidability and complexity results for probabilistic automata [Baier et al. 2008 Baier and Größer 2005; Chadha et al. 2009a Chadha et al. , 2009b Chadha et al. , 2010 Gimbert and Oualhadj 2010; Chatterjee and Tracol 2012; Fijalkow et al. 2012] , for POMDPs [Chatterjee et al. 2010b; Baier et al. 2008; Tracol et al. 2009; Chatterjee et al. 2013a] , and stochastic games [Chatterjee et al. 2013b; Nain and Vardi 2013; Chatterjee et al. 2013c] ).
The special case of perfect observation for a player corresponds to every observation for this player being a singleton. Depending on which player has perfect observation, we consider the following one-sided subclasses of the general two-sided partialobservation stochastic games: (1) player 1 partial and player 2 perfect where player 2 has perfect observation, and player 1 has partial observation; and (2) player 1 perfect and player 2 partial where player 1 has perfect observation, and player 2 has partial observation. The case where the two players have perfect observation corresponds to the well-known perfect-information (perfect-observation) stochastic games [Shapley 1953; Condon 1992; de Alfaro et al. 2007] .
Note that in a given game G, if player 1 wins in the setting of player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, then player 1 wins in the game G as well. Analogously, if player 1 cannot win in the setting of player 1 perfect and player 2 partial, then player 1 does not win in the game G either. In this sense, the one-sided games are conservative over-and under-approximations of two-sided games. In the context of applications in verification and synthesis, the conservative approximation is that the adversary is all powerful, and hence player 1 partial and player 2 perfect games provide the important worst-case analysis of partial-observation games.
Objectives and Qualitative Problems. In this work we consider partial-observation stochastic games with reachability objectives where the goal of player 1 is to reach a set of target states, and games with Büchi objectives where the goal for player 1 is to visit some target state infinitely often. The study of partial-observation games is considerably more complicated than games of perfect observation. For example, in contrast to perfect-observation games, strategies in partial-observation games require both randomization and memory for reachability objectives; and the quantitative problem of deciding whether there exists a strategy for player 1 to ensure that the target is reached with probability at least 1 2 can be decided in PSPACE for perfectobservation stochastic games [Etessami and Yannakakis 2006] , (in NP ∩ coNP for turnbased perfect-observation stochastic games [Condon 1992 ] where players make moves in turns), whereas the problem is undecidable even for partial-observation stochastic games with only one player [Paz 1971 ]. Since the quantitative problem is undecidable we consider the following qualitative problems: the almost-sure (resp., positive) problem asks whether there exists a strategy for player 1 to ensure that the target set is reached with probability 1 (resp., positive probability). The qualitative problems for Büchi objectives are defined similarly where the goal is to visit the target set infinitely often with probability 1 (resp., positive probability) for the almost-sure (resp., positive) problem. For Büchi objectives, the positive problem is undecidable, and the almost-sure problem is polynomially equivalent to the almost-sure problem for reachability objective [Baier et al. 2008] . Therefore, we discuss reachability objectives, and the results for Büchi objectives follow.
Classes of Strategies.
In general, randomized strategies are necessary to win with probability 1 in a partial-observation game with reachability objective [Chatterjee et al. 2007 ]. However, there exist two types of randomized strategies where either (i) actions are visible, the player can observe the action he played [Chatterjee et al. 2007; Bertrand et al. 2009], or (ii) actions are invisible, the player may choose a probability distribution over actions, but the source of randomization is external and the actual choice of the action is invisible to the player [Gripon and Serre 2009] . The second model is more general since the qualitative problems of randomized strategies with actions visible can be reduced in polynomial time to randomized strategies with actions invisible, by modeling the visibility of actions using the observations on states.
With actions visible, the almost-sure (resp., positive) problem was shown to be EXPTIME-complete (resp., PTIME-complete) for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect [Chatterjee et al. 2007] , and 2EXPTIME-complete (resp., EXPTIME-complete) in the two-sided case ]. For the positive problem memoryless randomized strategies exist, and for the almost-sure problem belief-based strategies exist (strategies based on subset construction that consider the possible current states of the game) [Chatterjee et al. 2007; .
It was remarked (without any proof) in [Chatterjee et al. 2007, p. 4 ] that these results easily extend to randomized strategies with actions invisible for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect. It was claimed in Gripon and Serre [2009] (Theorems 1 and 2) that the almost-sure problem is 2EXPTIME-complete for randomized strategies with actions invisible for two-sided games, and that belief-based strategies are sufficient for player 1. Thus it is believed that the two qualitative problems with actions visible or actions invisible are essentially equivalent.
Pure Strategies and Motivation. In this article, we consider the class of pure strategies, which do not use randomization at all. Pure strategies arise naturally in the synthesis of controllers and processes that do not have access to any source of randomization. In graph games, the adversary is all powerful, and a randomized strategy against all-powerful strategies requires perfect randomization. Since the practical sources of randomization are pseudo-random, they are effectively pure strategies against the adversary in graph games. Hence the pure strategies question has been considered in many synthesis problems in applications related to programming languages as well as planning, such as synchronizers for lock placement in concurrent programs [Cerný et al. 2011] , and controllers for robot planning [Kress-Gazit et al. 2009 ]. Moreover we will establish deep connections between the qualitative problems for pure strategies and for randomized strategies with actions invisible, which on one hand exhibit major flaws in previous results of the literature (the remark without proof of Chatterjee et al. [2007] and the main results of Gripon and Serre [2009] ), and on the other hand show that the solution for almost-sure winning randomized strategies with actions invisible (which is the most general case) can be surprisingly obtained by solving the problem for pure strategies.
Relevance of Two-Sided Games. While for controller synthesis problems the player 1 partial and player 2 perfect model is relevant, the two-sided model (partial information for both players) is also of considerable interest. In protocol synthesis with multiple processes, where each process has private variables invisible to other processes, the two-sided model is more appropriate. For example, synthesis of fair-exchange protocols (a security protocol for exchange of digital signature) under partial information requires the two-sided model [Jamroga et al. 2012] . Moreover, for synthesis of lock synchronization in concurrent programs the two-sided model is more appropriate; for example, in concurrent programs accessing a shared list, the lock synchronization and the scheduling policies do not depend on the variables in the list [Cerný et al. 2011] , and therefore both players have partial observation. Finally, the two-sided partial observation stochastic games with action-invisible strategies is the most general form of two-player partial-observation stochastic games, and has been extensively studied in the stochastic game theory community [Aumann 1995; Rosenberg et al. 2003; Sorin 2002; Renault 2012 ]. We will show that our results for pure strategies imply memory bounds for two-sided games with action-invisible strategies.
Contributions. In summary, our contributions are the following. (1) For player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, we show that (in contrast to all previous results in the literature) belief-based pure strategies are not sufficient, and present optimal (exponential) memory and tight (EXPTIME) complexity bound for the qualitative problems.
(2) For player 1 perfect and player 2 partial we show a counter-intuitive result that the optimal memory bound for pure strategies is nonelementary (in sharp contrast to the previous exponential bound). (3) For two-sided games we show finite memory is sufficient for pure strategies. (4) For memory bounds, we establish an unexpected equivalence of pure and randomized action-invisible strategies for almost-sure winning, that implies a nonelementary lower bound whereas previously an exponential upper bound was claimed. We now present the details.
(1) Player 1 partial and player 2 perfect. We show that both for almost-sure and positive winning, belief-based pure strategies are not sufficient. This implies that the classical approaches relying on the belief-based subset construction cannot work for solving the qualitative problems for pure strategies. However, we present an optimal exponential upper bound on the memory needed by pure strategies. By a reduction to a perfect-observation game of exponential size, we show that both the almost-sure and positive problems are EXPTIME-complete for one-sided games with perfect observation for player 2. In contrast to the previous proofs of EXPTIME upper bound that rely either on subset constructions or enumeration of belief-based strategies, our correctness proof relies on a novel rank-based argument that works uniformly both for positive and almost-sure winning. Our construction also provides symbolic algorithms for solving the qualitative problems that avoids the explicit exponential construction. Thus for the important case of player 1 partial and player 2 perfect we establish optimal memory and complexity bounds, and present symbolic algorithms for the qualitative problems. (2) Player 1 perfect and player 2 partial.
(a) We show a very surprising result that both for positive and almost-sure winning, pure strategies for player 1 require memory of nonelementary size (i.e., a tower of exponentials). This is in sharp contrast with (i) the case of randomized strategies (with or without actions visible) where memoryless strategies are sufficient for positive winning, and with (ii) the previous case where player 1 has partial observation and player 2 has perfect observation, where pure strategies for positive winning require only exponential memory. Surprisingly and perhaps counter-intuitively when player 1 has more information and player 2 has less information, the positive winning strategies for player 1 require much more memory (nonelementary as compared to exponential). With more information player 1 can win in more states, but the winning strategy is much harder to implement. (b) We present a nonelementary upper bound for the memory needed by pure strategies for positive winning. We then show with an example that for almostsure winning more memory may be required as compared to positive winning. Finally, we show how to combine pure strategies for positive winning in a recharging scheme to obtain a nonelementary upper bound for the memory required by pure strategies for almost-sure winning. (3) General (two-sided) case. We show that in the general (two-sided) case finite memory strategies are sufficient both for positive and almost-sure winning. (4) Randomized strategies with actions invisible. For randomized strategies with actions invisible we present two reductions to establish connections with pure strategies. First, we show that the almost-sure problem for randomized strategies with actions invisible can be reduced in polynomial time to the almost-sure problem for pure strategies. The reduction requires to first establish that finite-memory randomized strategies are sufficient in two-sided games. Second, we show that the problem of almost-sure winning with pure strategies can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of randomized strategies with actions invisible. For this reduction it is crucial that the actions are not visible. Our reductions have deep consequences. They unexpectedly imply that the problems of almost-sure winning with pure strategies or randomized strategies with actions invisible are polynomial-time equivalent. Moreover, it follows that even in one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, belief-based randomized strategies with actions invisible are not sufficient for almost-sure winning. This shows that the remark (without proof) of Chatterjee et al. [2007] that the results (such as existence of belief-based strategies) of randomized strategies with actions visible carry over to actions invisible is an oversight. However from our first reduction and our results for pure strategies it follows that there is an exponential upper bound on memory and the problem is EXPTIME-complete for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect. More importantly, our results exhibit a serious flaw in the main result of Gripon and Serre [2009] which showed that belief-based randomized strategies with actions invisible are sufficient for almost-sure winning in two-sided games, and concluded that enumerating over such strategies yields a 2EXPTIME algorithm for the problem. Our second reduction and lower bound for pure strategies show that the result is incorrect, and that the exponential (beliefbased) upper bound is far off. Instead, the lower bound on memory for almost-sure winning with randomized strategies and actions invisible is nonelementary. Thus, contrary to the intuition, there is a sharp contrast for randomized strategies with or without actions visible.
The memory requirements are summarized in Table I and the results of this article are shown in bold font. We explain how the other results of the table follow from results of the literature. For randomized strategies (with or without actions visible), if a positive winning strategy exists, then a memoryless strategy that plays all actions uniformly at random is also positive winning. Thus the memoryless result for positive winning strategies follows for all cases of randomized strategies. The belief-based bound for memory of almost-sure winning randomized strategies with actions visible follows from [Chatterjee et al. 2007; ]. The memoryless strategies results for almost-sure winning for one-sided games with player 1 perfect and player 2 partial are obtained as follows: when actions are visible, then belief-based strategies coincide with memoryless strategies as player 1 has perfect observation. If player 1 has perfect observation, then for memoryless strategies whether actions are visible or not is irrelevant and thus the memoryless result also follows for randomized strategies with actions invisible. Thus along with our results we obtain Table I .
Related Works. We have already mentioned the most relevant related works about the various (partial-observation) games considered in this article. The seminal works of Reif [1979 Reif [ , 1984 introduced partial-observation nonstochastic games in computer science, and used subset construction as the main technique to analyze such games for winning with certainty (which is same as winning with pure strategies in non-stochastic games). It was shown in Chatterjee et al. [2007] that belief-based randomized strategies with actions visible are sufficient for almost-sure winning in partial-observation games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect for reachability and Büchi objectives. extended the results of Chatterjee et al. [2007] , showing that even for two-sided games belief-based randomized strategies with actions visible are sufficient. Gripon and Serre [2009] considered two-sided games under randomized strategies with actions invisible. In the study of partial-observation games, the previous results led to the following intuitions for reachability and Büchi objectives: (1) belief-based strategies are sufficient; (2) the memory requirement for randomized strategies with actions visible and actions invisible is the same; and (3) the memory Fig. 1 . Belief-only is not enough for positive (as well as almost-sure) reachability. A one-sided reachability game with reachability objective in which player 1 is blind and player 2 has perfect observation. If we consider pure strategies, then player 1 has a positive (as well as almost-sure) winning strategy, but there is no belief-based memoryless positive winning strategy. requirement for two-sided games is the same as for games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect. Our results show that none of the previous intuitions is correct.
DEFINITIONS
A probability distribution on a finite set S is a function κ : S → [0, 1] such that s∈S κ(s) = 1. The support of κ is the set Supp(κ) = {s ∈ S | κ(s) > 0}. We denote by D(S) the set of probability distributions on S. Given s ∈ S, the Dirac distribution on s assigns probability 1 to s.
Games. Given finite alphabets A i of actions for player i (i = 1, 2), a stochastic game on A 1 , A 2 is a tuple G = Q, q 0 , δ where Q is a finite set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and δ :
is a probabilistic transition function that, given a current state q and actions a, b for the players gives the transition probability δ(q, a, b)(q ) to the next state q . The game is called deterministic if δ(q, a, b) is a Dirac distribution for all (q, a, b) 
In some examples, we allow an initial distribution of states. This can be encoded in our game model by a probabilistic transition from the initial state.
A player-1 state is a state q where δ (q, a, b) = δ(q, a, b ) for all a ∈ A 1 and all b, b ∈ A 2 . We use the notation δ(q, a, −). Player-2 states are defined analogously. In figures, we use boxes to emphasize that a state is a player-2 state, and we represent probabilistic branches using diamonds (which are not real 'states', e.g., as in Figure 1) .
In a (two-sided) partial-observation game, the players have a partial or incomplete view of the states visited and of the actions played in the game. This view may be different for the two players and it is defined by equivalence relations ≈ i on the states and on the actions. For player i, equivalent states (or actions) are indistinguishable. We denote by O i ⊆ 2 Q (i = 1, 2) the equivalence classes of ≈ i which define two partitions of the state space Q, and we call them observations (for player i). These partitions uniquely define functions obs i : Q → O i (i = 1, 2) such that q ∈ obs i (q) for all q ∈ Q, that map each state q to its observation for player i.
In the case where all states and actions are equivalent (i.e., the relation ≈ i is the Plays and Observations. Initially, the game starts in the initial state q 0 . In each round, player 1 chooses an action a ∈ A 1 , player 2 (simultaneously and independently) chooses an action b ∈ A 2 , and the successor of the current state q is chosen according to the probabilistic transition function δ (q, a, b) . A play in G is an infinite sequence ρ = q 0 a 0 b 0 q 1 a 1 b 1 q 2 . . . such that q 0 is the initial state and δ(q j , a j , b j )(q j+1 ) > 0 for all j ≥ 0 (the actions a j 's and b j 's are the actions associated to the play). Its length is |ρ| = ∞. The length of a play prefix ρ = q 0 a 0 b 0 q 1 . . . q k is |ρ| = k, and its last element is Last(ρ) = q k . A state q ∈ Q is reachable if it occurs in some play. We denote by Plays(G) the set of plays in G, and by Prefs(G) the set of corresponding finite prefixes. The observation sequence for player i (i = 1, 2) of a play (prefix) ρ is the (in)finite sequence obs i (ρ) = obs i (q 0 )obs i (q 1 ) . . . , and given a play
The games with one-sided partial-observation are the special case where either ≈ 1 is equality and hence O 1 = {{q} | q ∈ Q} (player 1 has complete observation) or ≈ 2 is equality and hence O 2 = {{q} | q ∈ Q} (player 2 has complete observation). The games with perfect observation are the special cases where ≈ 1 and ≈ 2 are equality, that is, every state and action is visible to both players. 
We omit analogous definitions of strategies for player 2. We denote by G ,
O G , and P G the set of all player-1 strategies, the set of all observation-based player-1 strategies, the set of all pure player-1 strategies, the set of all player-2 strategies, the set of all observation-based player-2 strategies, and the set of all pure player-2 strategies in G, respectively.
Beliefs. The belief of a player is the set of states in which the game can possibly be according to all the informations available to the player, namely their own strategy and the observation of the play prefix. Formally, the belief of player 1 after the play prefix ρ when strategy σ is fixed is the set B(ρ, σ ) = {Last(ρ ) | ρ ≈ 1 ρ and ρ is compatible with σ }.
Given a randomized strategy σ fixed by player 1, the belief is computed inductively along a play both in the case of actions visible and actions invisible, however, the computation is different in the two cases. Initially, the belief of player 1 is B 0 = {q 0 }, and it is updated as follows.
-(Actions visible). Given a play prefix ρ, if the belief of player 1 in ρ is B i , then define the belief of player 1 in the play prefix ρ a i b i q i+1 by
-(Actions invisible). Given a play prefix ρ, let A = Supp(σ (ρ)) be the support of the distribution on actions played by player 1 in ρ. If the belief of player 1 in ρ is B i , then define the belief of player 1 in the play prefix ρa i b i q i+1 (where a i ∈ A) by
It is easy to show by induction on the length of play prefixes that B(ρ, σ ) = B |ρ| (for example, see [Chatterjee et al. 2007 , Lemma 2.1] for actions visible). Note that in the case of actions invisible, the update of the belief depends on the support of the distribution on actions played by the strategy but not on the precise action chosen since the strategy does not see the actions, whereas in the case of actions visible, the belief update depends on the precise actions chosen.
Remark 2.1. The model of games with partial observation on both actions and states can be encoded in a model of games with actions invisible and observations on states only: when actions are invisible, we can use the state space to keep track of the last action played, and reveal information about the last action played using observations on the states [Gripon and Serre 2009] . Therefore, in the sequel we assume that the actions are invisible to the players with partial observation. A play is then viewed as a sequence of states only, and the definition of strategies is updated accordingly. Note that a player with perfect observation has actions and states visible (and the equivalence relation ≈ i is equality).
Finite-Memory Strategies.
A player-1 strategy uses finite-memory if it can be encoded by a deterministic transducer Mem, m 0 , α u , α n where Mem is a finite set (the memory of the strategy), m 0 ∈ Mem is the initial memory value, α u : Mem × O 1 → Mem is an update function, and α n : Mem × O 1 → D(A 1 ) is a next-move function. The size of the strategy is the number |Mem| of memory values. If the current observation is o, and the current memory value is m, then the strategy chooses the next action according to the probability distribution α n (m, o) , and the memory is updated to α u (m, o). Formally, Mem, m 0 , α u , α n defines the strategy σ such that σ (ρ · q) = α n ( α u (m 0 , obs 1 (ρ)), obs 1 (q)) for all ρ ∈ Q * and q ∈ Q, where α u extends α u to sequences of observations as expected. This definition extends to infinite-memory strategies by dropping the assumption that the set Mem is finite. A strategy is memoryless if |Mem| = 1. A belief-based strategy for player 1 is a strategy that uses the set of beliefs as memory (say Mem = 2 Q ), and updates its memory according to Eq. (2) where the set A is given by the next-move function.
Objectives. An objective (for player 1) in G is a set ϕ ⊆ Plays(G) of plays. A play ρ ∈ Plays(G) satisfies the objective ϕ, denoted ρ |= ϕ, if ρ ∈ ϕ. Objectives are generally Borel measurable: a Borel objective is a Borel set in the Cantor topology [Kechris 1995] . Given strategies σ and π for the two players, the probabilities of a measurable objective ϕ is uniquely defined [Vardi 1985] . We denote by Pr σ,π q 0 (ϕ) the probability that ϕ is satisfied by the play obtained from the starting state q 0 when the strategies σ and π are used.
We specifically consider the following objectives. Given a set T ⊆ Q of target states, the reachability objective requires that the play visit the set T : Reach(T ) = {q 0 a 0 b 0 q 1 . . . ∈ Plays(G) | ∃i ≥ 0 : q i ∈ T }, and the Büchi objective requires that the play visit the set T infinitely often, Büchi(T ) = {q 0 a 0 b 0 q 1 . . . ∈ Plays(G) | ∀i ≥ 0 · ∃ j ≥ i : q j ∈ T }. Our solution for reachability objectives will also use the dual notion of safety objective that requires the play to stay within the set T :
In figures, the target states in T are double-lined and labeled by .
Winning Modes: Positive, Almost-Sure, and Sure Winning Problems. Given a game structure G and a state q, an observation-based strategy σ for player 1 is almost-sure winning (resp., positive winning) for the objective ϕ from q if for all observation-based randomized strategies π for player 2, we have Pr σ,π q (ϕ) = 1 (resp., Pr σ,π q (ϕ) > 0). The strategy σ is sure winning if all plays compatible with σ satisfy ϕ. We also say that the state q is almost-sure (or positive, or sure) winning for player 1. We are interested in the problems of deciding, given a game structure G, a state q, and an objective ϕ, whether there exists a {pure, randomized} strategy which is {almost-sure, positive} winning from q for the objective ϕ.
Remark 2.2. The important special case of partial-observation Markov decision processes (POMDPs) corresponds to the case where either all states in the game are player-1 states (player-1 POMDPs) or all states are player-2 states (player-2 POMDPs). For a strategy σ , we denote by G σ the player-2 POMDP obtained as the synchronous product of G with the transducer defining σ . In all our analysis, the counter strategies of player 2 can be restricted to pure strategies, because once a strategy for player 1 is fixed, then we obtain a POMDP for player 2 in which pure strategies are as powerful as randomized strategies [Chatterjee et al. 2010a ].
Remark 2.3. (Almost-sure Büchi to almost-sure reachability [Baier et al. 2008]) . A reduction of almost-sure Büchi to almost-sure reachability was presented in Baier et al. [2008] for POMDPs. The idea of the reduction also works for two-sided games and is as follows: given a two-sided stochastic game with Büchi objective Büchi(T ), we add a new absorbing state q T , make q T the target state for the reachability objective, and from every state q ∈ T add positive probability transitions to q T (details and correctness proof follow from Baier et al. [2008, Lemma 13] ). The key idea of the correctness of the reduction is as follows. If in the original game, Büchi states are visited infinitely often almost-surely, then the new target state is reached almostsurely (due to positive transition probability from the original Büchi states to the new target state). Conversely, if in the original game, Büchi states are visited infinitely often with probability less than 1, then since the only way to reach the new target state in the reduced game is through the Büchi states, it follows that the target state is reached with probability less than 1. This holds for any pair of strategies, and establishes the reduction.
For safety objectives almost-sure winning coincides with sure winning, however for reachability objectives they are different. The sure winning problem for the objectives we consider has been studied [Reif 1979; Chatterjee et al. 2007; Chatterjee and Doyen 2010] . The almost-sure winning problem for Büchi objectives reduces to the almostsure winning problem for reachability objectives (Remark 2.3). The positive winning problem for Büchi objectives is undecidable even for POMDPs [Baier et al. 2008] . Hence in this article we only focus on reachability objectives.
ONE-SIDED GAMES: PLAYER 1 PARTIAL AND PLAYER 2 PERFECT
In this section, we consider one-sided partial-observation games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect (player 2 sees the states visited in the game, and thus the actions played as well). We present the results for positive and almost-sure winning for reachability objectives along with examples that illustrate key elements of the problem such as the memory required for winning strategies.
In the following example we show that belief-based strategies are not sufficient for positive as well as almost-sure winning for pure strategies. It is known that for reachability objectives, belief-based strategies are sufficient in both onesided and two-sided games, for sure-winning with pure and randomized strategies [Reif 1979; Chatterjee et al. 2007 ], for almost-sure winning with action-visible randomized strategies [Chatterjee et al. 2007; , and randomized memoryless strategies are sufficient for positive winning ]. A simple self-contained proof of the almost-sure winning case with action-visible randomized strategies is presented in the appendix. We now consider the case of pure strategies for almost-sure and positive winning.
Example 3.1. Belief-only is not enough for positive (as well as almost-sure) reachability. Consider the game in Figure 1 where player 1 is blind (all states have the same observation except the target state, and actions are invisible) and player 2 has perfect observation. Initially, player 2 chooses the state q 1 or q 2 (which player 1 does not see). The belief of player 1 is thus the set {q 1 , q 2 }.We claim that no belief-based pure strategy is positive (nor almost-sure) winning for player 1. Consider the belief-based pure strategy that plays action a when the belief is {q 1 , q 2 }. Then a counter strategy for player 2 is to choose q 2 initially. This ensures that the game remains in q 2 , while the belief of player 1 remains {q 1 , q 2 } and thus player 1 keeps playing a. A symmetric argument shows that playing b when the belief is {q 1 , q 2 } is also not even positive winning. However, there exists an almost-sure winning strategy for player 1 which is to alternate between playing a and b when the belief is {q 1 , q 2 }, showing that belief-based strategies are not sufficient.
We present reductions of the almost-sure and positive winning problem for reachability objective to the problem of sure-winning in a game of perfect observation with Büchi objective, and reachability objective respectively. The two reductions are based on the same construction of a game where the state space L = {(s, o) | o ⊆ s ⊆ Q} contains the subset construction s enriched with obligation sets o ⊆ s which ensure that from all states in s, the target set T is reached with positive probability. LEMMA 3.2. Given a one-sided partial-observation stochastic game G with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect with a reachability objective for player 1, we can construct in time exponential in the size of the game and polynomial in the size of action sets a perfect-observation deterministic game H with a Büchi objective (resp., reachability objective) such that player 1 has a pure almost-sure (resp., positive) winning strategy in G iff player 1 has a sure-winning strategy in H.
PROOF. We present the construction and the proof in details for almost-sure reachability. The construction is the same for positive reachability, and the argument is described succinctly afterwards.
Construction. Given a one-sided game G = Q, q 0 , δ over alphabets A 1 , A 2 and observation set O 1 for player 1, with reachability objective Reach(T ), we construct the following (deterministic) game of perfect observation H = L, 0 , δ H over alphabets
Intuitively, s is the belief of player 1 and o is a set of obligation states that "owe" a visit to T with positive probability.
In a pair (a, u) ∈ A 1 , we call a the action, and u the witness set; -A 2 = O 1 . In the game H, player 2 simulate player 2's choice in game G, as well as resolves the probabilistic choices. This amounts to choosing a possible successor state, and revealing its observation; -α = {(s, ∅) ∈ L}; -δ H is defined as follows. First, the state (∅, ∅) is absorbing. Second, in every other state (s, o) ∈ L the function δ H ensures that (i) player 1 chooses a pair (a, u) such that Supp(δ(q, a, b)) ∩ u = ∅ for all q ∈ o and b ∈ A 2 , and (ii) player 2 chooses an
If a player violates this, then a losing absorbing state is reached with probability 1. Assuming the above condition on (a, u) and γ is satisfied, define δ H ((s, o) , (a, u) , γ ) as the Dirac distribution on the state (s , o ) such that:
Note that for every reachable state (s, o) in H, there exists a unique observation γ ∈ O 1 such that s ⊆ γ (which we denote by obs 1 (s)).
We show the following property of this construction. Player 1 has a pure observationbased almost-sure winning strategy in G for the objective Reach(T ) if and only if player 1 has a sure winning strategy in H for the objective Büchi(α).
Mapping of Plays. Given a play prefix
By induction on the length of ρ H , we show that (1) for each q k ∈ s k there exists a matching play ρ G (which visits no T -state) such that Last(ρ G ) = q k , and (2) for all play
it is easy to see that ρ G = q 0 is a matching play with q 0 ∈ T if and only if s 0 = o 0 = {q 0 }. For the induction step, assume that we have constructed matching plays for all play prefixes of length k − 1, and
) and with Last(ρ G ) = q k−1 , which we can extend to ρ G .q k to obtain a play prefix matching ρ H . To prove (2), it is easy to see that every play prefix matching ρ H is an extension of play prefix matching (
Mapping of Strategies, from G to H (Ranking Argument).
First, assume that player 1 has a pure observation-based almost-sure winning strategy σ in G for the objective Reach(T ). We construct an infinite-state MDP G σ = Q + , ρ 0 , δ σ where:
-Q + is the set of nonempty finite sequences of states;
+ , and probability 0 to all other ρ ∈ Q + ; if Last(ρ) ∈ T , then ρ is an absorbing state;
We define a ranking of the reachable states of G σ . Assign rank 0 to all ρ ∈ Q + such that Last(ρ) ∈ T . For i = 1, 2, . . . assign rank i to all nonranked ρ such that for all player 2 actions b ∈ A 2 , there exists ρ ∈ Supp(δ σ (ρ, b)) with a rank (and thus with a rank smaller than i). We claim that all reachable states of G σ get a rank. By contradiction, assume that a reachable state ρ = q 0 q 1 . . . q k is not ranked (note that q i ∈ T for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k). Fix a strategy π for player 2 as follows. Since ρ is reachable in
is reached with positive probability in G under strategies σ and π . From ρ, the strategy π continues playing as follows. If the current state ρ is not ranked (which is the case of ρ), then choose an action b such that all states in Supp(δ σ (ρ, b)) are not ranked. The fact that ρ is not ranked ensures that such an action b exists. Now, under σ and π all paths from Last( ρ) in G avoid T -sates. Hence the set T is not reached almost-surely, in contradiction with the fact that σ is almost-sure winning. Hence all states in G σ get a rank. We denote by Rank(ρ) the rank of a reachable state ρ in G σ . From the strategy σ and the ranking in G σ , we construct a strategy σ in the game H as follows. Given a play
} is a witness set which selects successor states of o k with decreased rank along each branch of the MDP G σ .
Note that all matching play prefixes ρ G have the same observation sequence. Therefore, the action a = σ (ρ G ) is unique and well-defined since σ is an observation-based strategy. Note also that the pair (a, u) is an allowed choice for player 1 by definition of the ranking, and that for each q ∈ o k , all matching play prefixes ρ G with Last(ρ G ) = q have the same rank in G σ . Therefore we abuse notation and write Rank(q) for Rank(ρ G ), assuming that the set o k to which q belongs is clear from the context. Let
Correctness of the Mapping. We show that σ is sure winning for Büchi(α) in H. 
Mapping of Strategies
, from H to G. Given a strategy σ in H, we construct a pure observation-based strategy σ in G.
We define σ (ρ G ) by induction on the length of ρ G . In fact, we need to define σ (ρ G ) only for play prefixes ρ G which are compatible with the choices of σ for play prefixes of length smaller than |ρ G | (the choice of σ for other play prefixes can be fixed arbitrarily). For all such ρ G , our construction is such that there exists a play prefix ρ H = θ (ρ G ) compatible with σ such that ρ G is matching ρ H , and if
We define σ and θ (·) as follows.
. Note that property ( ) holds. For the induction step, let k ≥ 1 and assume that from every play prefix ρ G of length smaller than k, we have defined σ (ρ G ) and
. Therefore, the property ( ) holds.
Note that the strategy σ is observation-based because if
Correctness of the Mapping. If player 1 has a sure winning strategy σ in H for the objective Büchi(α), then we can assume that σ is memoryless (since in perfect-observation deterministic games with Büchi objectives memoryless strategies are sufficient for sure winning [Emerson and Jutla 1991; Thomas 1997] ), and we show that the strategy σ defined above is almost-sure winning in G for the objective Reach(T ).
Since σ is memoryless and sure winning for Büchi(α), in every play compatible with σ there are at most n = |L| ≤ 3 |Q| steps between two consecutive visits to an α-state. The properties of matching plays entail that if a play prefix ρ G compatible with σ has no visit to T -states, and (
then under strategy σ for player 1 and arbitrary strategy π for player 2, there is a way to fix the probabilistic choices such that all plays extension of ρ G visit a T -state. To see this, consider the probabilistic choices given at each step by the witness component u of the action (·, u) played by σ . By the definition of the mapping of plays and of the transition function in H, it can be shown that if (
is a play fragment of θ (ρ G ) (hence compatible with σ ) where s i = o i and o j = ∅ for all i ≤ j < k, then the "owe" set o k is the set of all states that can be reached in G from states s i along a path which is compatible with both the action played by the strategy σ (and σ ) and the probabilistic choices fixed by σ , and visits no T -states. Since the "owe" set gets empty within at most n steps regardless of the strategy of player 2, all paths compatible with the probabilistic choices must visit a T -state. This shows that under any player 2 strategy, within n steps, a T -state is visited with probability at least r n where r > 0 is the smallest nonzero probability occurring in G. Therefore, the probability of not having visited a T -state after z · n steps is at most (1 − r n ) z which vanishes for z → ∞ since r n > 0. Hence, against arbitrary strategy of player 2, the strategy σ ensures the objective Reach(T ) with probability 1.
Memory Bound.
Since H is a perfect-information game, pure memoryless sure winning strategies exist in H for Büchi objectives [Emerson and Jutla 1991; Thomas 1997] . Consider a pure memoryless sure winning strategy in H, and the strategy ensures that if a state (s, o) visited in the play, then it satisfies that o ⊆ s ⊆ γ for some γ ∈ O 1 (i.e., the first component is a subset of some observation). The number of distinct states (s, o) such that o ⊆ s ⊆ γ for some γ ∈ O 1 is bounded by γ ∈O 1 3 |γ | , where |γ | is the cardinality of γ (i.e., the number of different states in the observation γ ). It follows that memory of size γ ∈O 1 3 |γ | suffices for almost-sure winning for pure strategies for reachability objectives in one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect.
Argument for Positive Reachability. The proof for positive reachability follows the same line as for almost-sure reachability, with the following differences. The construction of the game of perfect information H is now interpreted as a reachability game with objective Reach(α). The mapping of plays is the same as above. In the mapping of strategies from G to H, we use the same ranking construction, but we only claim that the initial state gets a rank. The argument is that if the initial state would get no rank, then player 2 would have a strategy to ensure that all paths avoid the target states, in contradiction with the fact that player 1 has fixed a positive winning strategy. The rest of the proof is analogous to the case of almost-sure reachability.
Memory Bound. We first observe that if the objective is Reach(α), then all states in α can be converted to absorbing states. Hence it follows that if the objective in H is the reachability objective, then the obligation component does not need to be recharged when it becomes empty (in contrast to the case when the objective in H is the Büchi objective). Hence a sure winning strategy in H for the objective Reach(α) can only depend on the obligation component (i.e., for a state (s, o), the sure winning strategy only depends on o). We also remark that if the game G is a nonstochastic game, then the obligation component coincides with belief. As before, if a state (s, o) is reachable, then o ⊆ s ⊆ γ for some γ ∈ O 1 . Since H is a perfect-information game, pure memoryless sure winning strategies exist in H for reachability objectives [Emerson and Jutla 1991; Thomas 1997] . Hence it follows that memory of size γ ∈O 1 2 |γ | suffices for positive winning for pure strategies for reachability objectives in one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect.
It follows from the construction in the proof of Lemma 3.2 that pure strategies with exponential memory are sufficient for positive (as well as almost-sure) winning, and the exponential lower bound follows from the problem of shortest witness for nonuniversality of nondeterministic finite automata. Lemma 3.2 also gives EXPTIME upper bound for the problem since perfect-observation Büchi games can be solved in polynomial time [Thomas 1997 ]. The EXPTIME-hardness follows from the sure winning problem for nonstochastic games [Reif 1984 ], where pure almost-sure (positive) winning strategies coincide with sure winning strategies. We have the following theorem summarizing the results. Symbolic Algorithms. The exponential Büchi (or reachability) game constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.3 can be solved by computing classical fixpoint formulas [Emerson and Jutla 1991] . However, it is not necessary to construct the exponential game structure explicitly. Instead, we can exploit the structure induced by the pre-
(s , o ) are also winning because they correspond to a better belief and a looser obligation. Hence all sets computed by the fixpoint algorithm are downward-closed and thus they can be represented symbolically by the antichain of their maximal elements (see Chatterjee et al. [2007] for details related to antichain algorithms and Doyen and Raskin [2010] for a survey of the antichain approach). This technique provides a symbolic algorithm without explicitly constructing the exponential game.
ONE-SIDED GAMES: PLAYER 1 PERFECT AND PLAYER 2 PARTIAL
In this section, we consider one-sided partial-observation games with player 1 perfect, and player 2 partial. Recall that we are interested in finding a pure winning strategy for player 1. Therefore, when we construct counter-strategies for player 2, we always Fig. 2 . Remembering the belief of player 2 is necessary. A one-sided reachability game where player 1 (round states) has perfect observation, player 2 (square states) is blind. Player 1 has a pure almost-sure winning strategy that depends on the belief of player 2 (in q 2 ), but no pure memoryless strategy is almost-sure winning.
assume that player 1 has already fixed a pure strategy. This is important for the way the belief of player 2 is updated. Although player 2 does not have perfect information about the actions played by player 1, the belief of player 2 can be updated according to the precise actions of player 1 because the response and the counterstrategy of player 2 is chosen after player 1 fixed a strategy.
The results of this section show that the optimal memory bound for pure strategies is nonelementary, in sharp and unexpected contrast to the exponential bound of Section 3, and thus the intuition that the memory requirement for two-sided games is the same as for games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect is incorrect.
Lower Bound on Memory
We start with an example to illustrate that player 1 needs to remember the belief of player 2 both for positive and almost-sure winning.
Example 4.1. Remembering the Belief of Player 2 is Necessary. We present an example of a game where player 1 has perfect observation but needs to remember the belief of player 2 to ensure positive or almost-sure reachability. The game is shown in Figure 2 . The target is T = { }. Player 2 is blind. If player 2 chooses a in the initial state q 0 , then his belief will be {q 1 , q 2 }, and if he plays b, then his belief will be {q 2 , q 3 }. In q 2 , the choice of player 1 depends on the belief of player 2. If the belief is {q 1 , q 2 }, then playing a in q 2 is not a good choice because the belief of player 2 would become {q 4 } and player 2 could surely avoid by further playing b. For symmetrical reasons, if the belief of player 2 is {q 2 , q 3 } in q 2 , then playing b is not a good choice for player 1. Therefore, there is no positively winning memoryless strategy for player 1. However, we show that there exists an almost-sure winning strategy for player 1 that uses the belief of player 2 as follows: in q 2 , play b if the belief of player 2 is {q 1 , q 2 }, and play a if the belief of player 2 is {q 2 , q 3 }. Note that player 1 has perfect observation and thus can observe the actions of player 2 (and thus compute the current belief of player 2). This ensures the next belief of player 2 to be {q 4 , q 5 } and therefore no matter the next action of player 2, the state is reached with probability 1 2 . Repeating this strategy ensures to reach with probability 1. Fig. 3 . A one-sided reachability game L n with reachability objective in which player 1 is has perfect observation and player 2 is blind. Player 1 needs exponential memory to win positive reachability.
We present a family of games where player 1 needs memory of nonelementary size to satisfy both almost-sure and positive reachability. The key idea is that player 1 needs to remember not only the possible current states of the game (belief of player 2), but also how many paths that player 2 cannot distinguish end up in each state. Then we show that player 1 needs to simulate a counter system where the operations on counters are increment and division by 2 (with round down) which requires to store nonelementary values of the counters in the worst case. The key challenge is to construct a polynomialsize game to simulate nonelementary counter values. We show how to use the partial observation of player 2 to achieve this. This will establish the surprising nonelementary lower bound.
Example 4.2. Memory of Nonelementary Size May be Necessary for Positive and
Almost-Sure Reachability. We show that player 1 may need memory of nonelementary size to win positively (as well as almost-surely) in a reachability game. We present a family of one-sided games G n where player 1 has perfect observation, and player 2 has partial observation both about the state of the game, and the actions played by player 1. We explain the example step by step. The key idea of the example is that the winning strategy of player 1 in game G n will need to simulate a counter system (with n integer-valued counters) where the operations on counters are increment and division by 2 (with round down), and to reach strictly positive counter values.
Counters. First, we use a simple example to show that counters appear naturally in the analysis of the game under pure strategies.
Consider the family of games (L n ) n∈N shown in Figure 3 , where the reachability objective is Reach({q 0 }). In the first part, the states L and R are indistinguishable for player 2. Consider the strategy of player 1 that plays b in L and R. Then, the state q n is reached by two play prefixes ρ up = q I Lq n and ρ dw = q I Rq n that player 2 cannot distinguish. Since by Remark 2.2, pure strategies are sufficient for player 2, consider an arbitrary pure strategy for player 2. It follows that the same action is played by player 2 in both play prefixes, while perfectly-informed player 1 can play different actions. In particular, if player 1 plays a in ρ up and b in ρ dw , then no matter the action chosen by player 2 the state q n−1 is reached with positive probability. However, because only one play prefix reaches q n−1 , this strategy of player 1 cannot ensure to reach q n−2 with positive probability.
Player 1 can ensure to reach q n−2 (and q 0 ) with positive probability with the following exponential-memory strategy. For the first n − 1 visits to either L or R, play a, and on the n-th visit, play b. This strategy produces 2 n different play prefixes from q I to q n , each with probability 1 2 n . Considering the mapping L → a, R → b, each such play prefix ρ is mapped to a sequence w ρ of length n over {a, b} (for example, the play prefix ρ = q I Lq I Rq I Lq n is mapped to w ρ = aba). The strategy of player 1 is to play the sequence w ρ in the next n steps after ρ. This strategy ensures that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, there are 2 i play prefixes that reach q i with positive probability, all being indistinguishable for player 2. The argument is an induction on i. The claim is true for i = n, and if it holds for i = k, then no matter the action chosen by player 2 in q k , the state q k−1 is reached with positive probability by half of the 2 k play prefixes, that is, 2 k−1 play prefixes. This establishes the claim. As a consequence, one play prefix reaches q 0 with positive probability. This strategy requires exponential memory, and an inductive argument shows that this memory is necessary because player 1 needs to have at least 2 play prefixes that are indistinguishable for player 2 in state q 1 , and at least 2 i play prefixes in q i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Nonelementary Counters. Now, we present a family C n of counter systems where the shortest execution is of nonelementary length (specifically, the shortest length is greater than a tower 2 2 · · 2 of exponentials of height n). The counter system C 4 (for n = 4) is shown in Figure 4 . The operations on counters can be increment (+1), division by 2 (÷2), and idle (·). In general, C n has n counters c 1 , . . . , c n and n + 1 states q 0 , . . . , q n . In state q i of C n (0 ≤ i ≤ n), the counter c i can be incremented and at the same time all the counters c j for j > i are divided by 2. From q n , to reach q 0 with strictly positive counters (i.e., all counters have value at least 1), we show that it is necessary to execute the self-loop on state q n a nonelementary number of times. In Figure 4 , the numbers above the self-loops show the number of times they need to be executed. When leaving q 1 , the counters need to have value at least 2 in order to survive the transition to q 0 which divides all counters by 2. Since the first counter can be incremented only in state q 1 , the self-loop in q 1 has to be executed 2 times. Hence, when leaving q 2 , the other counters need to have value at least 2 · 2 2 = 2 3 in order to survive the self-loops in q 1 . Therefore, the self-loop in q 2 is executed 2 3 times. And so on. In general, if the self-loop on state q i is executed k times (in order to get c i = k), then the counters c i+1 , . . . , c n need to have value k · 2 k when entering q i (in order to guarantee a value at least k of these counters after k successive division by 2). In q n , the last counter c n needs to have value f n (1) where f n is the n-th iterate of the function f : N → N such that f (x) = x · 2 x . This value is greater than a tower of exponentials of height n.
Gadgets for Increment and Division. In Figure 5 , we show the gadgets that are used to simulate operations on counters. The gadgets are game graphs where the player-1 actions a, b are indistinguishable for player 2 (but player 2 can observe and distinguish the action #). The actions a, b are used by player 1 to simulate the operations on the counters. The # is used to simulate the transitions from state q i to q i−1 of the counter system of Figure 4 . All states of the gadgets have the same observation for player 2. Recall that player 1 has perfect observation.
The idle gadget is straightforward. The actions a, b have no effect. In the other gadgets, the value of the counters is represented by the number of paths that are indistinguishable for player 2, and that end up in the entry state of the gadget (for the value of the counter before the operation) or in the exit state (for the value of the counter after the operation).
Consider the division gadget div 2 . If player 2 plays an action that matches the choice of player 1, then the game leaves the gadget and the transition will go to the initial state of the game we construct (which is shown on Figure 6 ). Otherwise, the action of player 2 does not match the action of player 1 and the play reaches the exit state of the gadget. Let k be the number of indistinguishable 1 paths in the entry state of the gadget. By playing a after k 1 such paths and b after k 2 paths (where k 1 + k 2 = k), player 1 ensures that min{k 1 , k 2 } indistinguishable paths reach the exit state of the gadget (because in the worst case, player 2 can choose his action to match the action of player 1 over max{k 1 , k 2 } paths). Hence, player 1 can ensure that k 2 indistinguishable paths get to the exit state. In the game of Figure 6 , the entry and exit state of some division gadgets are merged. The argument still holds.
Consider the increment gadget inc on Figure 5 . We use this gadget with the assumption that the entry state is not reached by more than one indistinguishable path. This will be the case in the game of Figure 6 . Player 1 can achieve k indistinguishable paths in the exit state as follows. In state q ab , play action a if the last visited state is L, and play action b if the last visited state is R. No matter the choice of player 2, one path will reach the exit state, and the other path will get to the entry state. Repeating this scenario k times gives k paths in the exit state. Note that the self-loop in the exit state is used to prolong the paths in the exit state, and make the k paths of the same length (hence indistinguishable by player 2).
We show that there is essentially no faster way to obtain k paths in the exit state. Indeed, if player 1 chooses the same action (say a) after the two paths ending up in q ab , then against the action b from player 2, two paths reach the exit state, and no state get to the entry state. Then, player 1 can no longer increment the number of paths. Therefore, to get k paths in the exit state, the fastest way is to increment one by one up to k − 2, and then get 2 more paths as a last step. Note that it is not of the interest of player 2 to match the action of player 1 if player 1 plays the same action, because this would double the number of paths.
Structure of the game. The game G n which requires memory of nonelementary size is sketched in Figure 6 for n = 3. Its abstract structure is shown in Figure 7 , corresponding to the structure of the counter system in Figure 4 . The alphabet of player 1 is {a, b, #}. For the sake of clarity, some transitions are not depicted in Figure 7 . It is assumed that for player 1, playing an action from a state where this action has no transition depicted leads to the initial state of the game. For example, playing # in state q 4 goes to the initial state, and from the target state , all transitions go to the initial state. Figure 6 shows the initial state q I of the game from which a uniform probabilistic transition branches to the three states q 7 , r 7 , s 7 . The idea of this game is that player 1 needs to ensure that the states q 1 , r 1 , s 1 are reached with positive probability by indistinguishable paths, so as to ensure that no matter the action (a, b, or c) chosen by player 2, the state is reached with positive probability. From q 1 , r 1 , s 1 , the other actions of player 2 (i.e., b and c from q 1 , a and c from r 1 , etc.) lead to the initial state. Player 2 can observe the initial state. All the other states are indistinguishable.
Intuitively, each "line" of states (q's, r's, and s's) simulate one counter. Synchronization of the operations on the three counters is ensured by the special (and visible to player 2) symbol #. Intuitively, since # is visible to player 2, player 1 must play # at the same "time" in the three lines of states (i.e., after the same number of steps in each line). Otherwise, player 2 may eliminate one line of states from his belief. For example, say after k steps, the game could be in state q 7 , r 7 , or some state s j (5 ≤ j ≤ 7), and if player 1 plays # 1 in the states q 7 and r 7 , but plays a different action from s j , then player 2 observing # 1 after k steps can safely update his belief to {q 6 , r 6 }, and thus avoid to play c when one of the states q 1 , r 1 is reached. In Figure 6 , the dotted lines and the subscripts on # emphasize the layered structure of the game, corresponding to the structure of Figure 7 .
To ensure that there are indistinguishable paths ending up in each of the states q 1 , r 1 , s 1 , player 1 needs to generate paths in each "line", and this can be done only using the increment gadget in each line. Concretely, for the first counter c 1 the value must be at least x 1 = 2 when leaving the increment gadget (before playing # 3 and entering q 2 ) in order to survive the transition leading to q 1 . Since in the second line, the division gadget is executed in r 3 at the same time (thus after # 2 , and before # 3 is played), the value of the second counter must be at least x 2 = x 1 · 2 x 1 = 2 · 2 2 when leaving the increment gadget, corresponding to the value shown in the second state of Figure 4 . In the third line, the value of the counter must be at least x 3 = x 2 · 2 x 2 when leaving the increment gadget, and so on (in general with more counters). We now present the three steps of the proof.
-Positive winning strategy exists. An inductive argument shows that if player 1 simulates the counter system of Figure 4 , then a positive counter value is reached simultaneously in the last states of each line. This ensures that no matter the choice of player 2 in the last step of each line, the target state is reached at least from one of the last states of each line. This ensure positive winning for player 1. -Lower bound. The analysis of the family C n of counter systems (illustrated in Figure 4 ) showed that the number of increments needed in the n-th line (i.e., the n-th counter) is greater than a tower of exponentials of height n (by inductive argument on n). It follows that player 1 needs memory of size nonelementary in order to ensure indistinguishable paths ending up in each of the states q 1 , r 1 , . . . , and win with positive probability. Note that if indistinguishable paths do not end up in each of the last step of each line (say for example, that player 2 knows that q 1 is not reached in Figure 6 ), then player 2 can play an action to prevent that the target is reached (action a in Figure 6 ). -Bound for almost-sure winning. In the item above we already argued that in the example even for positive winning nonelementary memory is required. To claim the lower bound for almost-sure winning we need to establish the existence of a pure almost-sure winning strategy. Since all paths that do not reach the target state go back to the initial state, the pure positive winning strategy can be repeated over and over again to achieve almost-sure reachability as well.
The desired result follows. 
Upper Bound for Positive Reachability with Almost-Sure Safety
We present the algorithmic solution of one-sided games with a conjunction of positive reachability and almost-sure safety objectives, in which player 1 has perfect observation and player 2 has partial observation. This will be useful in Section 4.3 to solve almostsure reachability, and using a trivial safety objective (safety for the whole state space) it also gives the algorithmic solution for positive reachability.
Let G = Q, q 0 , δ G be a game over alphabets A 1 , A 2 and observation set O 2 for player 2, with reachability objective Reach(T ) (where T ⊆ Q) and safety objective Safe(Q G ) (where Q G ⊆ Q represents a set of good states) for player 1. We assume that the states in T are absorbing and that T ⊆ Q G . This assumption is satisfied by the games we consider in Section 4.3, as well as by the case of a trivial safety objective (Q G = Q). The goal of player 1 is to ensure positive probability to reach T and almostsure safety for the set Q G .
We first describe the key steps of the proof. First, we compute the set of states from which player 1 can satisfy the objective with a randomized action-visible strategy. Second, we show how pure strategies can simulate randomized strategies by using the stochasticity of the transition relation and the fact that player 2 cannot distinguish observationally-equivalent paths. This is the main novel idea behind this proof. Finally, we show that if the number of indistinguishable paths is nonelementary, then player 1 achieves the full power of randomized action-visible strategies and is winning using the computation of the first step. Thus we first consider the case of randomized strategies. After that, we use the results of randomized strategies to solve the case of pure strategies.
Step 1. Winning with Randomized Strategies. First, we show that with randomized strategies, memoryless strategies are sufficient. It suffices to play uniformly at random the set of safe actions. In a state q, an action a ∈ A 1 is safe if Post G (q, a, b) ⊆ Win safe for all b ∈ A 2 , where Win safe is the set of states that are sure winning 2 for player 1 in G for the safety objective Safe(Q G ). Playing all safe actions uniformly at random ensures that the set Q \ Q G of bad states is never reached, and from the positive winning region of player 1 for Reach(T ) it ensures that the set T is reached with positive probability. Therefore, computing the set Z of states that are winning for player 1 with a randomized strategy can be done by fixing the uniformly randomized safe strategy for player 1, and checking that player 2 does not almost-surely win the safety objective Safe(Q\ T ), which requires the analysis of a POMDP for almost-sure safety and can be done in exponential time using a simple subset construction [Chatterjee et al. 2010b, Theorem 2] .
Note that T ⊆ Z and that from all states in Z, player 1 can ensure that T is reached with positive probability within at most 2 |Q| steps (because after fixing the positive winning strategy for player 1, there must be an acyclic path from all states in Z to the target in the subset-construction-based POMDP for player 2), while from any state q ∈ Z, player 1 cannot win positively with a randomized strategy, and therefore also not with a pure strategy.
Step 2. Pure Strategies to Simulate Randomized Strategies. Second, we show that pure strategies can in some cases simulate the behavior of randomized strategies. As we have seen in the gadget inc of Figure 5 , if there are two play prefixes ending up in the same state and that are indistinguishable for player 2 (e.g., q 0 Lq ab and q 0 Rq ab in the example), then player 1 can simulate a random choice of action over support {a, b} by playing a after q 0 Lq ab , and playing b after q 0 Rq ab . No matter the choice of player 2, one of the plays will reach q 0 and the other will reach the exit state of the gadget. Intuitively, this corresponds to a uniform probabilistic choice of the actions a and b: the state q 0 and the exit state are reached with probability 1 2 . In general, if there are |A 1 | indistinguishable play prefixes ending up in the same state q, then player 1 can simulate a random choice of actions over A 1 from q. However, the number of indistinguishable play prefixes in a successor state q may have decreased by a factor |A 1 | (there may be just one play reaching q ). Hence, in order to simulate a randomized strategy during k steps, player 1 needs to have |A 1 | k indistinguishable play prefixes. Since 2 |Q| steps are sufficient for a randomized strategy to achieve the reachability objective with positive probability, an upper bound on the number of play prefixes that are needed to simulate a randomized strategy using a pure strategy is K 1 = |A 1 | 2 |Q| . More precisely, if the belief of player 2 is B ⊆ Z and in each state q ∈ B there are at least K 1 indistinguishable play prefixes, then player 1 wins with a pure strategy that essentially simulates a winning randomized strategy (which exists since q ∈ Z) for 2 |Q| steps.
Step 3. Counting Abstraction for Pure Strategies. We present a construction of a game of perfect observation H such that player 1 wins in H if and only if player 1 wins in G. The objective in H is a conjunction of positive reachability and almost-sure safety objectives, for which pure memoryless winning strategies exist: for every state we restrict the set of actions to safe actions, and then we solve positive reachability on a perfect-observation game. The result follows since for perfect-observation games pure memoryless positive winning strategies exist for reachability objectives [Condon 1992 ].
State Space. The idea of this construction is to keep track of the belief set B ⊆ Q of player 2, and for each state q ∈ B, the number of indistinguishable play prefixes that end up in q. For k ∈ N, we denote by [k] the set {0, 1, . . . , k}. A state of H is a counting function f : Q → [K * ] ∪ {ω} where K * ∈ N, to be chosen later, is of order
where the number of nested exponentials is of order O(|Q|). We often view a counting function as a set of |Q| counters.
As we have seen in the example of Figure 6 , it may be necessary to keep track of a nonelementary number of play prefixes. We show that the bound K * is sufficient, and that we can substitute larger numbers by the special symbol ω to obtain a finite counting abstraction. The belief associated with a counting function f is the set Supp( f ) = {q ∈ Q | f (q) = 0}, and the states q such that f (q) = ω are called ω-states. Action Alphabet. In H, an action of player 1 is a function a : Q × [K * ] → A 1 that assigns to each copy of a state in the current belief (of player 2), the action played by player 1 after the corresponding play prefix in G (according to an arbitrary ordering on the play prefixes). We denote by Supp( a(q, ·)) = { a(q, i) | i ∈ [K * ]} the set of actions played by a in q ∈ Q. The action set of player 2 in the game H is the same as in G.
Transitions. Let 1(a, A) be 1 if a ∈ A, and 0 if a ∈ A. We denote this function by 1(a ∈ A). Given f and a as above, given an action b ∈ A 2 and an observation γ ∈ O 2 , let f = Succ ( f, a, b, γ ) be the function such that f (q ) = 0 for all q ∈ γ , and such that for all q ∈ γ :
Note that if the current state q is an ω-state, then only the support Supp ( a(q, ·) ) of the function a matters to compute f . Now f = Succ( f, a, b, γ ) may not be a counting function because it may assign values greater than K * to some states. We show that beyond certain bounds, it is not necessary to remember the exact value of a counters f (q) and we can replace such large values by ω. Intuitively, the ω value can be interpreted as "large enough to be positive for sufficiently long". This abstraction needs to be done carefully in order to obtain the desired upper bound (namely, K * ). As explained before, the counter values represent the number of indistinguishable paths. A player-1 strategy by playing different actions in different indistinguishable paths can simulate a randomized strategy. Intuitively, a counter value is large enough if it allows to play all actions in the support of a randomized strategy. Thus a counter value is large enough for a single step if the counter has value at least |A 1 |, as this allows player 1 to play every action at least once among the indistinguishable paths. A counter value is large enough for K steps if the value is at least |A 1 | K since this allows to simulate a randomized strategy for K steps. We now present an inductive argument to formalize the notions of "large enough" and "sufficiently long".
-We first consider the base case when all counters can be set to ω. We know that if all counters have value greater than K 1 = |A 1 | 2 |Q| , then player 1 wins by simulating a randomized strategy for sufficiently long which is 2 |Q| steps. Therefore, when all counters but one have already value ω, we set the last counter to ω if it has value greater than K 1 . In other words, when all counters are set to ω, then sufficiently long is 2 |Q| steps. -Now we consider the inductive case. First we consider when all counters but one are set to ω. By the base case when the value of the last counter exceeds K 1 then it is set to ω. Since reaching the value upto K 1 can take at most K 1 steps, the other counters with value ω need to have value at least K 2 = K 1 · |A 1 | K 1 to remain large enough (i.e., at least K 1 ) for sufficiently long (i.e., at least K 1 steps). Therefore, when all counters but two have already value ω, whenever a counter gets value greater than K 2 we set it to ω. This can take at most (K 2 ) 2 steps and the other counters with value ω need to have value at least
2 . In general, when all counters but k have value ω, we set a counter to ω if it has value at least
k . In other words, when all counters but k have value ω, then sufficiently long is K k steps.
Taking K * = K |Q| , it follows by induction that K * is of order
where the tower of exponential is of height |Q|, and thus we do not need to store counter values greater than K * . We define the abstraction mapping f = Abs( f ) for f : Q → N as the |Q|-th iterate of the following procedure Let k = |{q | f (q) = ω}| be the number of counters with value ω in f . If there is a state q with finite value f ( q) greater than K n−k , then f ( q) = ω and f agrees with f on all states except q (i.e., f (q) = f (q) for all q = q).
Given f , a, and b, let δ H ( f, a, b) be the uniform distribution over the set of counting functions f such that there exists an observation γ ∈ O 2 such that f = Abs (Succ( f, a, b, γ ) ) and Supp( f ) = ∅.
Note that the operators Succ(·) and a, b, γ ) for all a, b, γ (where ≤ is the componentwise order).
Objective. Given T ⊆ Q and Q G ⊆ Q defining the reachability and safety objectives in G, the objective in the game H is a conjunction of positive reachability and almostsure safety objectives, defined by Reach(T H ) where A onesided reachability game where player 1 (round states) has perfect observation, player 2 (square states) is blind. Player 1 has a pure almost-sure winning strategy, but no pure belief-based memoryless strategy is almost-sure winning. However, player 1 has a pure belief-based memoryless strategy that is positive winning.
algorithmic solution of almost-sure reachability games where player 1 has perfect observation and player 2 has partial observation (he is blind in this case). For player 1, playing a in q 1 and in q 2 is a positive winning strategy to reach . This is because from {q 1 , q 2 }, the belief of player 2 becomes {q 3 , q 4 } and no matter the action chosen by player 2, the state is reached with positive probability from either q 3 or q 4 .
However, always playing a when the belief of player 2 is {q 1 , q 2 } is not almost-sure winning because if player 2 chooses always the same action (say a) in {q 3 , q 4 }, then with probability 1 2 the state is not reached. Intuitively, this happens because player 2 can guess that the initial state is, say q 1 , and be right with positive probability (here 1 2 ). To be almost-surely winning, player 1 needs to alternate actions a and b when the belief is {q 1 , q 2 }. The action b corresponds to the restart phase of the strategy, that is, even assuming that player 2's belief would be, say {q 1 }, the action b ensures that is reached with positive probability by making the belief to be {q 1 , q 2 }.
We now present a construction of a pure almost-sure winning strategy (when such a strategy exists) by repeatedly playing a strategy for positive reachability along with almost-sure safety in a recharging scheme. As a consequence we obtain a nonelementary upper bound on the memory size of almost-sure winning strategies. We first present an overview of the argument. Let Q B be the set of states such that if the belief of player 2 is a state in Q B , then against all strategies of player 1, player 2 can ensure that with positive probability the target is not reached. Hence an almost-sure winning strategy must ensure almost-sure safety for the set Q G = Q \ Q B . From Q G player 1 can ensure both positive reachability to the target as well as safety for the set Q G . We will show that repeatedly playing a strategy for positive reachability along with almost-sure safety is an almost-sure winning strategy for the reachability objective.
Notation. We consider T as the set of target states and without loss of generality assume that all target states are absorbing. In this section the current belief of player 2, given a prefix and the strategies, represents the set of states in which the game can be currently with positive probability given the prefix and the strategies. Given strategies σ and π for player 1 and player 2, respectively, a state q and a set K ⊆ Q we denote by Pr σ,π q,K (·) the probability measure over sets of paths when the players play the strategies, the initial state is q and the initial belief for player 2 is K.
In rest of this section we omit the subscript G (such as we write O instead of O G ) as the game is clear from the context.
Bad states. Let
q,{q} (Safe(T )) > 0 be the set of states q such that given the initial belief of player 2 is the singleton {q}, for all pure strategies for player 1 there is a observation-based counter strategy for player 2 to ensure that Safe(T ) is satisfied with positive probability. We will consider Q B as the set of bad states.
Property of an almost-sure winning strategy. Consider a pure almost-sure winning strategy for player 1 that ensures against all observation-based strategies of player 2 that T is reached with probability 1. Then we claim that the belief of player 2 must never intersect with Q B : otherwise if the belief intersects with Q B , let q be the state in Q B that is reached with positive probability. Then player 2 simply assumes that the current state is q, updates the belief to {q}, and the guess is correct with positive probability. Given the belief is {q}, since q ∈ Q B , it follows that against all player-1 pure strategies there is an observation-based strategy for player 2 to ensure with positive probability that T is not reached. This contradicts that the strategy for player 1 is almost-sure winning.
Transformation. We transform the game by changing all states in Q B as absorbing.
q,{q} (Reach(T )) = 1 . By the argument above that for a pure almost-sure winning strategy the belief must never intersect with Q B we have
G is trivial, and we now show the other inclusion Q p G ⊆ Q G . Observe that in Q p G we have the property of positive reachability and almost-sure safety and we will use strategies for positive reachability and almost-sure safety to construct an almost-sure winning strategy. We consider Q B as the set of unsafe states (i.e., Q G is the safe set), and T as the target and invoke the results of Section 4.2: for all q ∈ Q p G there is a pure finite-memory strategy σ q of memory at most B (where B is nonelementary) to ensure that from q, within N = 2 O(B) steps, T is reached with probability at least some positive constant η q > 0, even when the initial belief for player 2 is {q}. Let η = min q∈Q p G η q . A pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy is described below. The strategy plays in two phases (1) the Restart phase; and (1) the Play phase. We define them as follows.
(1) Restart phase. Let the current state be q, assume that the belief for player 2 is {q} and goto the Play phase with strategy σ q that ensures that Q G is never left and T is reached within N steps with probability at least η > 0.
(2) Play phase. Let σ be the strategy defined in the Restart phase, then play σ for N steps and go back to the Restart phase.
The strategy is almost-sure winning as for all states in Q p G and for all histories, in every N steps the probability to reach T is at least η > 0, and Q G (and hence Q p G ) is never left. Thus probability to reach T in N · steps, for ∈ N, is at least 1 − (1 − η) and this is 1 as → ∞. Thus the desired result follows and we obtain the almost-sure winning strategy.
Memory Bound and Algorithm. The memory upper bound for the almost-sure winning strategy constructed is as follows: |Q| · B + log N, we require |Q| strategies of Section 4.2 of memory size B and a counter to count up to N = 2
O(B)
steps. We now present an algorithm for almost-sure reachability that works in time O(2 |Q| ×POSREACHSURESAFE), where POSREACHSURESAFE denote the complexity to solve the positive reachability along with almost-sure safety problem. The algorithm enumerates all subset Q ⊆ Q and then verifies that for all q ∈ Q player 1 can ensure to reach T with positive probability staying safe in Q with probability 1. In other words the algorithm enumerates all subsets Q ⊆ Q to obtain the set Q G . The enumeration is exponential and the verification requires solving the positive reachability with almost-sure safety problem. 
FINITE-MEMORY STRATEGIES FOR TWO-SIDED GAMES
In this section we show the existence of finite-memory pure strategies for positive and almost-sure winning in two-sided games. Finite-memory for almost-sure winning is proved by constructing a winning strategy that ensures (i) that the almost-sure winning set is never left (this is a safety condition), and (ii) within a fixed number N of steps, the target is reached with at least a constant probability η. We show that these two conditions can be ensured by a finite-memory strategy and the key arguments are as follows: we use the fact that belief-based strategies are sufficient for the safety condition, and then by a simple extension of König's Lemma [König 1936 ] establish that positive reachability implies that the target is reached after a finite number of steps. The result for almost-sure winning follows by combining these strategies in a recharging scheme analogous to the approach in Section 4.3.
Positive Reachability with Almost-Sure Safety
Let T be the set of target states for reachability (such that all the target states are absorbing) and Q G be the set of good states for safety with T ⊆ Q G . Our goal is to show that for pure strategies to ensure positive probability reachability to T and almost-sure safety for Q G , finite-memory strategies suffice. Note that with Q G as the whole state space we obtain the result for positive reachability as a special case. 
We prove the result with the following two claims. We fix a (possibly infinite-memory) strategy σ ∈ O ∩ P such that for all strategies π ∈ O of player 2, we have 
PROOF. The finite-memory strategy σ f is as follows: play like the strategy σ for the first N-steps, and then switch to a strategy to ensure Safe(Q G ) with probability 1. The strategy ensure positive probability reachability to T as for the first N-steps it plays like σ and σ already ensures positive reachability within N-steps. Moreover, since σ ensures Safe(Q G ) with probability 1, it must also ensure Safe(Q G ) for the first N-steps, and since σ f after the first N-steps only plays a strategy for almost-sure safety, it follows that σ f guarantees Safe(Q G ) with probability 1. The strategy σ f is a finitememory strategy since it needs to play like σ for the first N-steps (which requires finitememory) and then it switches to an almost-sure safety strategy for which exponential size memory is sufficient (for safety objective almost-sure winning coincides with sure winning and then belief-based strategies are sufficient; see [Chatterjee and Doyen 2010] for details). CLAIM 2. There exists N ∈ N such that for all strategies π ∈ O of player 2, we have
where Reach ≤N denotes reachability within first N-steps.
PROOF. The proof is by contradiction. Towards contradiction, assume that for all n ∈ N, there exists a strategy π n ∈ O such that either Pr
If for some n ≥ 0 we have Pr σ,π n q (Safe(Q G )) < 1, then we get a contradiction with the fact that Pr therefore Pr σ,π n q (Reach ≤n (T )) = 0 for all n ∈ N. Equivalently, all play prefixes of length at most n and compatible with σ and π n avoid to hit T , and thus Pr σ,π n q (Safe ≤n (Q \ T )) = 1 for all n ∈ N. Note that we can assume that each strategy π n is pure because once the strategy σ of player 1 is fixed we get a POMDP for player 2, and for POMDPs pure strategies are as powerful as randomized strategies [Chatterjee et al. 2010a] (in [Chatterjee et al. 2010a ] the result was shown for finite POMDPs with finite action set, but the proof is based on induction on the action set and also works for countably infinite POMDPs).
Using a simple extension of König's Lemma [König 1936 ], we construct a strategy π ∈ O such that Pr
The construction is as follows. In the initial state q, there is an action b 0 ∈ A 2 which is played by infinitely many strategies π n . We define π (q) = b 0 and let P 0 be the set {π n | π n (q) = b 0 }. Note that P 0 is an infinite set. We complete the construction as follows. Having defined π (ρ) for all play prefixes ρ of length at most k, and given the infinite set P k , we define π (ρ ) for all play prefixes ρ of length k + 1 and the infinite set P k+1 as follows. Consider the tuple b π n ∈ A m 2 of actions played by the strategy π n ∈ P k after the m prefixes ρ of length k + 1. Clearly, there exists an infinite subset P k+1 of P k in which all strategies play the same tuple b k+1 . We define π (ρ ) using the tuple b k+1 . This construction ensures that no play prefix of length k + 1 compatible with σ and π hit the set T , since π agrees with some strategy π n for arbitrarily large n. Repeating this inductive argument yields a strategy π such that Pr σ,π q (Safe(Q \ T )) = 1, in contradiction with the fact that Pr
Hence, the desired result follows.
These two claims establish Lemma 5.1 and give the following result.
THEOREM 5.2. In two-sided partial-observation stochastic games finite memory is sufficient for pure strategies to ensure positive probability reachability along with almostsure safety for player 1; and hence for pure positive winning strategies for reachability objectives finite memory is sufficient and nonelementary memory is required in general for player 1.
Almost-Sure Reachability
We now show that for pure strategies for almost-sure reachability, finite-memory strategies suffice. The proof is a straight forward extension of the results of Section 4.3. The only differences are that since player 1 has partial-observation we need to consider beliefs for player 1, and for finite-memory strategies for positive reachability with almost-sure safety we use the result of the previous section.
Notation. We consider T as the set of target states and without loss of generality assume that all target states are absorbing. In this section the belief of player 2 represents the set of states that can be with positive probability. Given strategies σ and π for player 1 and player 2, respectively, a state q and a set K ⊆ Q we denote by Pr σ,π q,K (·) the probability distribution when the players play the strategies, the initial state is q and the initial belief for player 2 is K.
In rest of this section we omit subscript G (such as we write O instead of O G ) as the game is clear from the context.
q,{q} (Safe(T )) > 0 be the set of beliefs B such that for all pure strategies for player 1 there is a counter strategy for player 2 with a state q ∈ B to ensure that given the initial belief of player 2 is the singleton {q}, Safe(T ) is satisfied with positive probability. We will consider Q B as the set of bad beliefs.
Property of an Almost-Sure Winning Strategy. Consider a pure almost-sure winning strategy for player 1 that ensures against all strategies of player 2 that T is reached with probability 1. Then we claim that the belief of player 2 must never intersect with Q B : otherwise if the belief intersects with Q B , let B be the belief in Q B that is reached with positive probability. Then there exists q ∈ B such that player 2 can simply assume that the current state is q, update the belief to {q}, and the guess is correct with positive probability, and then player 2 can ensure that against all player-1 pure strategies there is a strategy for player 2 to ensure with positive probability that T is not reached. This contradicts that the strategy for player 1 is almost-sure winning. Let Q G = 2 Q \ Q B . By definition we have
q,{q} (Reach(T )) = 1 . By the argument above that for a pure almost-sure winning strategy the belief must never intersect with Q B , we have
G is trivial, and we now show the other inclusion Q p G ⊆ Q G . Observe that in Q p G we have the property of positive reachability and almost-sure safety and we will use strategies for positive reachability and almost-sure safety to construct a witness finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy. Note that here we have safety for a set of beliefs (instead of set of states, and it is straight forward to verify that the argument of the previous subsection holds when the safe set is a set of beliefs). We consider Q B as the set of unsafe beliefs (i.e., Q G is the safe set), and T as the target and invoke the results of the previous subsection: for all B ∈ Q p G there is a pure finite-memory strategy σ B of to ensure that from all states q ∈ B, within N steps (for some finite N ∈ N), T is reached with probability at least some positive constant η B > 0, even when the initial belief for player 2 is {q}.
A pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy is described below. The strategy plays in two-phases: (1) the Restart phase; and (1) the Play phase. We define them as follows.
(1) Restart phase. Let the current belief be B, the belief for player 2 is any perfect belief {q}, for q ∈ B; and goto the Play phase with strategy σ B that ensures that Q G is never left and T is reached within N steps with probability at least η > 0. (2) Play phase. Let σ be the strategy defined in the Restart phase, then play σ for N steps and go back to the Restart phase.
The strategy is almost-sure winning as for all states in Q p G and for all histories, in every N steps the probability to reach T is at least η > 0, and Q G (and hence Q p G ) is never left. Thus probability to reach T in N · steps, for ∈ N, is at least 1 − (1 − η) and this is 1 as → ∞. Thus the desired result follows and we obtain the required finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy.
Memory Bound and Algorithm. The memory upper bound for the almost-sure winning strategy constructed is as follows: |2 Q | · B+ log N, we require |2 Q | strategies of the previous subsection of memory size B and a counter to count up to N steps; where B is the memory required for strategies to ensure positive reachability with almost-sure safety objectives. A nonelementary lower bound on memory follows from Corollary 4.8. THEOREM 5.3. In two-sided partial-observation stochastic games, finite memory is sufficient and nonelementary memory is required in general for pure strategies for almost-sure winning for reachability and Büchi objectives for player 1.
EQUIVALENCE OF RANDOMIZED ACTION-INVISIBLE STRATEGIES AND PURE STRATEGIES
In this section, we show that for two-sided partial-observation games, the problem of almost-sure winning with randomized action-invisible strategies is inter-reducible with the problem of almost-sure winning with pure strategies. The reductions are polynomial in the number of states in the game (the reduction from randomized to pure strategies is exponential in the number of actions). This equivalence of randomized action-invisible with pure strategies is counterintuitive, and the intuition that randomized strategies with actions visible and actions invisible are equivalent fails, since it follows from the reduction of pure to randomized action-invisible strategies that the nonelementary lower bounds obtained in Section 4 for pure strategies transfer to randomized strategies with actions invisible, whereas belief-based strategies are sufficient with actions visible.
Remark 6.1. We highlight two important aspects of the equivalence: (1) the equivalence holds for action-invisible strategies, but not in the special case of action-visible strategies; (2) the equivalence holds for almost-sure winning, but not positive winning. One reason of the first aspect fact is that when actions are visible, the belief update (according to Eq. (1), p. 8)) is based on the actual action played, even though the player was randomizing over a set of actions. The reason for the second aspect is for positive winning memoryless strategies that plays all actions uniformly at random are sufficient both for action-visible as well as action-invisible strategies.
Reduction of Randomized Action-Invisible Strategies to Pure Strategies
We give a reduction for almost-sure winning for randomized action-invisible strategies to pure strategies. Given a stochastic game G we construct another stochastic game H such that there is a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in G iff there is a pure almost-sure winning strategy in H. We first show in Lemma 6.2 the correctness of the reduction for finite-memory randomized action-invisible strategies, and then show in Lemma 6.3 that finite memory is sufficient in two-sided partialobservation games for randomized action-invisible strategies.
Construction. Given a stochastic game G = Q, q 0 , δ over action sets A 1 and A 2 , and observations O 1 and O 2 (along with the corresponding observation mappings obs 1 and obs 2 ), we construct a game H = Q, q 0 , δ H over action sets 2 A 1 \ {∅} and A 2 and observations O 1 and O 2 . The transition function δ H is defined as follows:
-for all q ∈ Q and A ∈ 2 A 1 \{∅} and b ∈ A 2 we have δ
, that is, in a state in Q player 1 selects a nonempty subset A ⊆ A 1 of actions and the transition function δ H simulates the transition function δ along with the uniform distribution over the set A of actions.
The following theorem follows from the previous two lemmas. For positive winning, randomized memoryless strategies are sufficient (both for action-visible and action-invisible) and the problem is PTIME-complete for one-sided and EXPTIME-complete for two-sided . The above theorem along with Theorem 3.3 gives us the following corollary for almost-sure winning for randomized action-invisible strategies.
COROLLARY 6.5. Given one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, the following assertions hold for reachability objectives for player 1.
(1) (Memory complexity 
Reduction of Pure Strategies to Randomized Action-Invisible Strategies
We present a reduction for almost-sure winning with pure strategies to randomized action-invisible strategies. Given a stochastic game G we construct another stochastic game H such that there exists a pure almost-sure winning strategy in G iff there exists a randomized almost-sure winning strategy in H. The idea of the reduction is to force player 1 to play a pure strategy in H. The game H simulates G and requires player 1 to repeat each actions played (that is, to play each action two times). Then, if player 1 uses randomization, he has to repeat the actions chosen randomly in the previous step. Since the actions are invisible, this can be achieved only if the support of the randomized actions is a singleton, that is, the strategy is pure. The reduction would not work with actions visible because player 1 could easily repeat every action (since the strategy can observe the action) without using a pure strategy (thus use the power of randomization).
Construction. Given a stochastic game G = Q, q 0 , δ G over action sets A 1 and A 2 , and observations O 1 and O 2 (along with the corresponding observation mappings obs 1 and obs 2 ), we construct a game H = Q ∪ (Q × A 1 ) ∪ {sink}, q 0 , δ H over the same action sets A 1 and A 2 and observations O 1 and O 2 . The transition function δ H is defined as follows.
-For all q ∈ Q and a ∈ A 1 and b ∈ A 2 we have δ H (q, a, b)((q, a)) = 1, that is, in a state q for action a of player 1, irrespective of the choice of player 2, the game stores player 1's action with probability 1. Belief-Based Strategies Are Not Sufficient. We illustrate our reduction with the following example that shows belief-based (belief-only) randomized action-invisible strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure reachability in one-sided partialobservation games (player 1 partial and player 2 perfect), showing that a remark (without proof) of Chatterjee et al. [2007, p. 4] and the result and construction of Gripon and Serre [2009, Theorem 1] are wrong.
Example 6.9. We illustrate the reduction of on the example of Figure 1 . The result of the reduction is given in Figure 9 . Remember that Example 3.1 showed that beliefbased pure strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure winning. We show that beliefbased randomized strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure winning in the game of Figure 9 . First, in {q 1 , q 2 } player 1 has to play pure since he has to be able to repeat the same action to avoid reaching a sink state with positive probability. Now, the argument is the same as in Example 3.1: playing always the same action (either a or Fig. 9 . Belief-based strategies are not sufficient. The game graph obtained by the reduction of pure to randomized strategies on the game of Figure 1 (for almost-sure reachability objective). Player 1 is blind and player 2 has perfect observation. There exists an almost-sure winning randomized strategy (with invisible actions), but there is no belief-based memoryless almost-sure winning randomized strategy.
b) in {q 1 , q 2 } is not even positive winning as player 2 can choose the state in this set (either q 2 or q 1 ).
Note that our reduction preserves the structure and memory of almost-sure winning strategies, hence the nonelementary lower bound given in Theorem 4.3 for pure strategies also transfers to randomized action-invisible strategies by the same reduction. 
DISCUSSION ON THE NONELEMENTARY MEMORY BOUND
In this section we discuss our results on the nonelementary memory bound. We start with one-sided games.
Discussion About the Surprising Nonelementary Memory Bound. We first discuss the surprising nonelementary memory bound for positive winning with reachability objectives for pure strategies in player-1 perfect player-2 partial stochastic games, comparing it with other related questions. We consider four related questions: two are related to stochasticity in transitions and strategies, and the other two are related to the information of the players (see also Figure 10 ).
(1) Question 1. If we consider player-1 perfect player-2 partial deterministic games with reachability objective, then for positive winning pure memoryless strategies are sufficient. This follows from the results Reif [1979] because in deterministic games positive winning coincides with sure winning, and the results Reif [1979] shows (see Chatterjee et al. [2007] for an explicit proof) that for sure winning the observation of player 2 is irrelevant. Hence the problem is same as sure winning in perfect-information deterministic games with reachability objective for which pure memoryless strategies exist. (2) Question 2. If we consider player-1 perfect player-2 partial stochastic games with reachability objective, but instead of pure strategies consider randomized strategies, then memoryless strategies are sufficient. It follows from that if there is a randomized strategy to ensure reachability with positive probability, then the randomized memoryless strategy that plays all actions uniformly at random is also a positive winning strategy. (3) Question 3. If we consider perfect-information stochastic games (both players have perfect information) with reachability objective, then for positive winning pure memoryless strategies are sufficient. This follows from a more general result of Condon [1992] that in perfect-information stochastic games with reachability objective, pure memoryless optimal strategies exist (note that for pure strategies, perfect-information stochastic games coincide with turn-based perfect-information stochastic games). (4) Question 4. If we consider player-1 partial player-2 perfect stochastic games with reachability objective, then for positive winning exponential memory pure strategies are sufficient (by Theorem 3.3).
Observe that the question we study is a very natural extension of the given questions: (1) adding stochasticity to the transition as compared to question 1; (2) restricting strategies to pure strategies as compared to randomized strategies of question 2; (3) player 2 is less informed as compared to question 3; and (4) player 1 is more informed and player 2 is less informed as compared to question 4. Our results show the natural variant of question 1 and question 2 obtained by adding stochasticity to transitions or removing stochasticity from strategies; and the variant of question 3 and question 4 by making player 1 most well informed lead to a surprising memory bound for strategies (nonelementary memory bound is sufficient and necessary in general, whereas for all the related questions memoryless or exponential-size memory strategies are sufficient). See also Figure 10 for a pictorial illustration.
Discussion for Two-Sided Games. We now discuss the memory requirements for positive winning strategies for two-sided games. For two-sided deterministic games with pure strategies, positive winning coincide with sure winning, and hence it follows from the results of [Reif 1979 ] that belief-based strategies are sufficient. For twosided games (deterministic or stochastic) with randomized strategies (action-visible or action-invisible) for positive winning memoryless strategies are sufficient where the randomized memoryless strategy plays all actions uniformly at random ]. For two-sided stochastic games with pure strategies, our results show that for positive winning finite-memory strategies are sufficient and nonelementary memory is required in general. Figure 11 presents a pictorial illustration.
CONCLUSION
In this work we considered the classical model of strategies with deterministic update of the memory. We briefly discuss the case when the memory-update function is stochastic and refer to them as stochastic-memory strategies. In a stochastic-memory randomized strategy, both the memory update and the next-move function of the strategy are stochastic. In a stochastic-memory pure strategy the memory update of the strategy is stochastic, but the next-move function is deterministic (i.e., nonstochastic). A stochastic-memory randomized strategy (with action visible) can be converted to a stochastic-memory pure strategy by simply encoding in an enlarged memory (product with the action space) which action to play next and use the stochastic update of memory states to simulate the randomization of the next-move function. Thus in case of stochastic-memory randomized strategy (both with action visible and action invisible), pure and randomized strategies are all equivalent. Translating a stochastic-memory strategy to a deterministic-memory strategy in general requires infinite memory (even in perfect-information games) [de Alfaro et al. 2007 ]. Partial-observation games with stochastic-memory strategies have been considered in ]. An interesting direction of future work is to obtain computational complexity bounds for the almost-sure and positive problems in one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 perfect and player 2 partial (see Section 4), and to establish the decidability and complexity of the same problems for two-sided partial-observation stochastic games (Section 6). Our work also makes an unexpected connection between partialobservation stochastic games and counter systems. While counter systems and games have been extensively studied for Petri nets and Vector Addition Systems with States (VASS) [Rackoff 1978; Rosier and Yen 1986; Brázdil et al. 2010; Finkel and GoubaultLarrecq 2012] , they have been studied in the context where the operations on the counters are increments and decrements. We show that the analysis of partial-observation stochastic games requires to consider counter systems with operations of increment and division by 2. The analysis of games over counters with the new class of operations gives rise to an interesting research direction for games over counters.
APPENDIX
In this section we show that for two-sided partial-observation stochastic games with reachability objectives and randomized action-visible strategies, belief-based randomized strategies are sufficient for almost-sure winning 4 . By Remark 2.3 the result also holds for Büchi objectives. The result was shown in Chatterjee et al. [2007, Theorem 4 .12] for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, and it was already mentioned in Bertrand et al. [2009, Theorem 2] that the result can be extended to two-sided games (the proof of Bertrand et al. [2009, Theorem 2] mentioned that the same technique of Chatterjee et al. [2007] achieves the result). We present the relevant details of the result, and also the proof we present is simpler as compared to Chatterjee et al. [2007] . After the relevant details we will present a comparison with the results of Chatterjee et al. [2007] .
Notation. We consider T as the set of target states and without loss of generality assume that all target states are absorbing. Let Q W be the set of almost-sure winning beliefs, that is, the set B of beliefs such that there is an observation-based randomized action-visible strategy for player 1 to ensure that T is reached almost-surely against all observation-based strategies of player 2 from the starting belief B. Let Q W be the complement set of beliefs, and it follows by definition that for all beliefs in Q W , for all observation-based randomized action-visible strategies for player 1, there exists a counter observation-based strategy for player 2 to ensure that with positive probability T is not reached.
Allowable Actions and the Winning Strategy. For every B ∈ Q W , we say an action a is allowable in B if for every observation γ ∈ O 1 , if (Post a,− (B) ∩ γ ) \ T = ∅, then (Post a,− (B) ∩ γ ) \ T ∈ Q W (we follow the terminology of allowable actions introduced in Chatterjee et al. [2007] ). In other words, an action is allowable for a belief B in Q W , if the action ensures that the next belief remains within the set Q W of almost-sure winning beliefs. Thus it follows that if player 1 plays an action that is not allowable, then player 2 can ensure to reach a belief in Q W with positive probability by playing all actions uniformly at random. We consider the belief-based randomized action-visible strategy σ * for player 1 that for a belief B ∈ Q W plays all allowable actions of B uniformly at random. First observe that playing strategy σ * ensures that the belief set is always in Q W , and to ensure that the next belief is in Q W it is crucial that the strategy is an action-visible randomized strategy. Our goal is to show that σ * is an almost-sure winning strategy for all beliefs in Q W . Once the strategy σ * is fixed we obtain a player-2 POMDP G σ * , and let X W ⊆ Q W be the set of almost-sure winning beliefs in the POMDP G σ * for player 1. Let Y W = Q W \ X W , and we assume towards contradiction that Y W is non-empty. Hence in the POMDP, from Y W player 2 can ensure positive safety (i.e., ensure with positive probability that T is not reached, and thus ensure positive safety for the complement set of T ). From the results of Chatterjee et al. [2010b, Lemma 1] and from the fact that for safety objectives almost-sure and sure winning coincide, it follows that in a POMDP if the set of beliefs from where positve safety can be ensured is non-empty, then the set of beliefs from where sure safety can be ensured is also non-empty. Hence let Z W ⊆ Y W be the set of beliefs for player 1 such that player 2 can ensure sure safety in G σ * . Since we assume Y W is nonempty we also have Z W is non-empty. Also it is known that for sure safety, a POMDP is equivalent to a game where all probabilistic choices are resolved by the opponent. Thus we have the following property in Z W : there is an observation-based strategy π * for player 2 such that against all observation-based randomized action-visible strategies for player 1 that only plays allowable actions with positive probability (and all actions that are not allowable are played with probability 0), the set of beliefs visited is always in Z W with certainty. We refer to the above property as sure winning property for player 2 in Z W . We are now ready to show the contraditcion. Consider a belief in Z W and an observation-based randomized action-visible strategy σ for player 1 (not necessarily belief-based), and we show that the strategy is not almost-sure winning and thus arrive at a contradiction that Z W ⊆ Q W and Q W is the set of almost-sure winning beliefs. We have two cases.
(1) If there exists a history that is possible with positive probability under σ such that the strategy σ plays an action that is not allowable with positive probability, then the counter strategy for player 2 plays all actions uniformly at random till an action that is not allowable is played and a belief in the set Q W is reached with positive probability. Moreover, player 2 guesses that a belief in Q W is reached in step i with probability 1 2 i+1 and the guess is correct with positive probability for some i. Once a belief in the set Q W is reached with positive probability, then by definition against all observation-based randomized action-visible strategies for player 1, there is a strategy for player 2 to ensure that with positive probability T is not reached. This ensures that σ is not an almost-sure winning strategy from Z W . (2) Otherwise for all possible histories the strategy σ plays only allowable actions, and then the strategy π * ensures that σ is not almost-sure winning by the sure winning property for player 2 in Z W . This case analysis establishes the contradiction and gives us the following result. Comparison with Related Results. In Chatterjee et al. [2007] the result was established for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, and it was mentioned in that the same proof can be extended to two-sided games. The proof of Chatterjee et al. [2007] was more involved as along with proving the result for belief-based strategy, it also provided an EXPTIME upper bound, and the proof required an involved construction of an exponential-size game and new notions of strategies (called equivalence-preserving strategies). As shown above, the proof for belief-based strategies can be obtained for the general two-sided games with a simpler argument that does not construct the involved exponential-size game. However the simpler argument does not give an EXPTIME upper bound (even in the one-sided case), and the naive complexity bound that can be obtained from the sufficiency of beliefbased strategies for almost-sure winning is 2EXPTIME (enumerating over the set of double-exponentially many belief-based strategies, and verifying the exponential-size POMDP obtained after fixing the strategy in double exponential time using the results of Chatterjee et al. [2010b] ). However, for two-sided games the 2EXPTIME complexity bound is optimal as a matching 2EXPTIME lower bound for almost-sure reachability in two-sided games with randomized action-visible strategies was established in . The above proof only shows that if there is an almost-sure winning strategy, then there is a belief-based one, and does not establish that in the complement set there is a spoiling strategy for the opponent player that prevents almost-sure winning against all strategies (i.e., the above proof does not establish the important property of determinacy). The fundamental determinacy property for randomized action-visible strategies for almost-sure reachability for two-sided games was established in . For the lower bound and other fundamental results related to qualitative determinacy of two-sided games we refer the reader to .
